

# Bringing CPTED into the 21st century

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**DESIGN  
AGAINST  
CRIME**



# Secure Place: Maiden Castle



# What is coming up

1. Brief introduction to CPTED
2. Problems and limitations of CPTED
3. Designing an updated CPTED

# **CPTED – An Introduction**

# **Defining CPTED: an 'Official' Version**

**“The proper design and effective use of the built environment that can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime and an improvement in the quality of life.**

**The goal of CPTED is to reduce opportunities for crime that may be inherent in the design of structures or in the design of neighborhoods.”**

**Crowe 2001**

# CPTED – Basic Principles

- Defensible space
- Access control
- Territoriality
- Surveillance
- Target hardening
- Image and maintenance
- Activity support

# CPTED Theory

- Situational Crime Prevention
  - Manipulate environment to increase risk, effort and guilt for offending, decrease reward & provocation
- Environmental criminology
  - Activity patterns – travelling and gathering
- Broken Windows
  - Failure to maintain environment prompts and provokes crime and provides increased opportunity

**A receptacle  
for grime?**



**Getting  
Designers  
Planners to  
Think Thief**

**Or a tool  
for crime?**



# Failure to 'Think Drug User'



# Does CPTED work?

## Overall conclusion of Cozens-Savile-Hillier 2005 review

- Cautious **YES** the components work...
- **But ...**
  - Support for effectiveness of comprehensive CPTED programmes not unequivocally demonstrated
  - Uncertain precisely how CPTED and its component parts work, where it works best and how to systematically evaluate its effectiveness beyond reasonable doubt – research needed

# **CPTED – Problems & Limitations**

# CPTED – Problems

- **Definition** imprecise & **scope** unclear - leave CPTED prone to fashion and drift of meaning, and to meaning different things to different agencies/disciplines
  - *Shift from public space to ‘hard security’ – do we want this?*
- In a disciplinary **‘No Man’s Land’**:
  - Isolated from criminology & crime prevention
  - Isolated from design & architecture
  - CPTED carries ‘historical baggage’



# CPTED Problems – Isolation from Criminology and Crime Prevention

- Problems with **individual principles** of CPTED
  - territoriality may not be universal – cultural context important
- Contradictions **between** CPTED principles - eg surveillance v territoriality
- Detailed **criminological evidence base** needs developing on specific risks of crime which CPTED seeks to tackle, and what interventions work in what contexts
  - Broken windows theory, while very plausible, only partially supported by research; but uncritically accepted by practitioners
- CPTED also carries **historical baggage**
  - Principles and theories not integrated
  - Bad for Knowledge Management



# CPTED Problems – Isolation from Design and Architecture

- CPTED sometimes fails to consider **whole system**, humans and all, not just physical aspect
- **Crime Prevention** often set **against** other design principles eg defensiveness *versus* accessibility, when **design** should be about creative optimisation of *all* relevant values/benefits
  - Designs should be simultaneously **user-friendly** whilst **abuser-unfriendly**
- Many police users of CPTED in *practice* see ‘design’ as a set of physical **products/buildings**. It should also be seen as a **process** – a way of doing and thinking - which applies to all kinds of crime prevention, imparting a design perspective and design approach



**Getting Crime Preventers to  
*Draw on Design***

# CPTED Limitations – Rigidity

CPTED can be used rigidly or flexibly

- Practitioners with elementary training risk rigidity and over-emphasis on crime, which can be costly or likely to discredit the approach in eyes of architects
- Failure to fit design requirements to context
- Cookbook copying doesn't work



# Beware cookbook copying – Importance of context for replication

## ELECTRONICALLY SECURED CYCLE PARKING

GHENT, BELGIUM



WALTHAMSTOW CENTRAL STATION, LONDON



# CPTED Limitations – Rigidity

- Adaptable criminals – countermoves, new tools and techniques to exploit environment, even shape it in their favour
  - Ironically, drug dealers and criminals use CPTED principles to create “offensible” space for own criminal activities
  - Failure of designers to anticipate



# False security from rigid prescription + adaptable criminals? 'Helpful' entrance porch



# Troublesome Tradeoffs – Reconciling conflicting values

Can we design secure places without jeopardising their main purpose and a range of other values:

- Convenience
- Aesthetics - fortress society
- Legal and ethical norms - privacy and freedom – CCTV?
- Social inclusion
- Sustainable environment
- Safety



**DAC doesn't have to be expensive**



# CPTED Limitations – Neglects Wider Social Context

- Efficacy of CPTED can be reduced (or increased) by **demographic** factors (eg high densities of young people) and **socio-economic** factors. Social conditions may nurture fear, reduce inclination to intervene and result in withdrawal of people into home, which becomes heavily fortified
- Realisation of this was one of reasons behind creation of **Second Generation CPTED** in late 1990s

# Second Generation CPTED (1)

## Focus on

- Social activities and social mix needed to encourage neighbours to take ownership of space & take advantage of natural surveillance
- Community (sub)culture
- Cohesion / social capital
- Connectivity / accessibility as much as defensibility

# Youth Shelter – designing for living space plus inclusion – Second Generation concept?





# Second Generation CPTED (2)

**Important issues raised, and design cannot neglect social factors, but:**

- Not all social interactions are positive – conformity pressure, conflict.
- Are ‘mixed use, mixed people’ conditions always beneficial? Need **evidence** base and clarification of **values** underlying our stance.
- Risk of flip from extreme of simplistic architectural determinism to dilution with vague social ideas.



# Updating CPTED



# **Specification to improve CPTED's fitness for purpose - redesign**

- **Clearer definition & scope of CPTED**
- **Better links to source disciplines – planning, design, architecture, policing, Crime Science, risk management...**
- **Strategic features**
  - **Clear social dimension**
  - **Scientific – evidence-based and theory-based**
  - **Adaptive**
  - **Scale- and context-sensitive**
  - **Creatively balance values and priorities within crime/safety & with other values**
  - **Professionalism – expertise, quality assurance, ethics**
  - **Good Process model for applying know-how**
  - **Futures-oriented – world out there, & using technology**


# Social Dimension of CPTED

- **Social aspects should be well-articulated and clear, eg:**
  - **Social cohesion / social capital** – capacity of community to act together to solve problems like crime, on basis of trust, familiarity, shared norms
  - **Immediate motivation for crime**, including conflict, need for young people to have facilities
- *Once clarified how these and other factors relate to environmental causes of crime, **design the environment to support them***


# Scale of CPTED




# Scope of CPTED - Intervening upstream, downstream of design?



# Strategic imbalance



# **Strategic balance – Put in most effort upstream – but leave human & physical flexibility downstream**






# When is design not design?

## 1. The technofix


- Shallow, single, exposed line of defence
- Bolt on, drop off



# When is design not design?

## 2. Heavy engineering

- Does the basic job well enough, but...
- Clunky, not user-friendly
- Ugly, maybe fear-inspiring



Problem...



Problem...



**'Engineering'  
solution**



# 'Engineering' solutions



**More  
aesthetic  
solution**



# Problem...





**More aesthetic solution**



**...but where do the drinkers go?**

# More aesthetic solution

- Traditional style
- With backup



# Design – product or process?



- Is design what we make, how we make it, or both?

# Importance of process knowledge – throwing away the cookbook

- Crime prevention requires practitioners to
  - Be adaptable, subtle, alert to tradeoffs – customising the response to context, and creating and configuring plausible proposals for new circumstances
  - Replication is innovation
  - Handle uncertainty and lack of complete knowledge of what works
  - Anticipate & allow for change
- This needs practitioners more like expert consultants than technicians




# Strengthening the foundations for know-how

- Professionalisation? Eg through Conceptual frameworks
  - Expanding **SARA – 5Is framework**
  - Expanding the **Crime Triangle – Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity**
  - Using **offender ‘Scripts’ – ‘Seek, See, Take, Escape, Sell’** to capture the **dynamics** of crime
- Careful - expertise is needed, but not as a barrier – *professional defensible space*
- Importance of **co-design** with the **users** of buildings, streets, malls

# CPTED - futures

- Changing crime – new tools, new targets
- Changing priorities

- Sustainability
- Low energy
- Resilience to climate shift, terrorism




- Privacy/freedom v security

# CPTED - futures

Changing context on all scales –  
crime threats and CP opportunities

- New land uses
- Blur between products, places, systems
- Intelligent homes linked to inte
- Automobiles v public transport
- Cameraphones – changing nature of ‘eyes on street’
- Intelligent CCTV, multimodal alarm systems
- New building materials – sensitive, resilient, anti-graffiti?




# **Technology of design visualisation –**

**Helping designers, clients and users  
with virtual reality design aids**



# Computer aided design



# Virtual Reality for lighting design

- Enables designers to visualise lighting before implementation
- Provides a means of communicating design ideas to different interest groups



**millets**

**Going Places**

*Thornlovs*

**GIRO CITTERI**

**Going Places**



**millets**  
THE GROCERY STORE

**Going Places**

*Thorntons*

CIRO CITTERIO

**Going Places**



millets

millets

millets

Going Places

The Newsstand

GIRO CITTERI

Going Places

# A New Definition of CPTED?

## CPTED is:

- Reducing the probability of crime & related problems, and their consequent harm, and enhancing the quality of life through community safety
- By using the processes of planning and design of the environment
- On a range of scales and types of place from individual buildings and interiors to wider landscapes, neighbourhoods & cities
- To produce designs that are 'fit for purpose', and contextually appropriate in all other respects
- Whilst achieving a balance between
  - the efficiency of avoiding crime problems *before* construction
  - and the *adaptability* of tackling them through subsequent management and maintenance

**TO BE CONTINUED...follow  
developments and contact us at**

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