Crime and Community Safety – assessing Risk and Impact

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DESIGN AGAINST CRIME

What's coming up

- Strategic approach to crime – futures orientation
- Tools for thinking, analysis and generating solutions in design and architecture
  - Definitions of crime, crime prevention, community safety, security
  - Crime and community safety risk and impact assessments
- Theoretical framework – for being rigorous and systematic – yet creative
- Example – micro scale – bike parking furniture
  - Risk – CRA/CIA
  - Response – design guidance

Strategic scope of intervention – upstream, downstream?

Planning

Design

Management & maintenance

Strategic imbalance



Strategic balance – Put in most effort upstream – but leave human & physical flexibility downstream



Crime

- **Crime** is mainly **conflict** between **individuals** over
  - Ownership of property
  - Integrity of person
  - Acceptability of behaviour…
- That violates the **law (**and perhaps less formal social norms) and thus places the offender in conflict with the **state** and its institutions.
- A wider range of misbehaviours share some of the above features – such as **disorder, nuisance or antisocial behaviour** at one extreme, and **terrorism** at the other
- **‘Victimless’ crime** violates the law (eg over misuse of illegal drugs) without any direct conflict between individuals

Crime prevention

- **Crime prevention** is
  - intervening in the causes of criminal events to reduce their risk, whether by the probability of their occurrence or their harmful consequences
- Or from an ‘active, adaptive offender’ perspective
  - disrupting criminal and crime-promoting activities to frustrate the achievement of criminal goals
- **Crime control** involves
  - holding the risk of criminal events and related misbehaviour below a tolerable level of probability and/or harm

Security / Risk management

- **Security** is deliberate and concerted action to reduce the risk of criminal events, before, during and after they happen
  - **Primary security –** action reduces **probability of harmful event**
  - **Secondary security** – if event does happen, action limits harm **as it unfolds** to product, owner and beyond – i.e. **increases resilience**
  - **Tertiary security** – action limits **propagation of harm** that may occur post-event, eg by preventing further offences such as identity theft following the theft of a credit card

Community safety [1]

- Community safety focuses less on individual criminal and disorderly events and more on consequences of crime and disorder as a whole
- The goal is **harm reduction and mitigation** and the delivery of a range of positive social and economic **benefits** rather than merely lowering the numbers/probability of criminal events
- It can be seen as an aspect of **quality of life**, a state of existence in which people, individually, collectively and in organisations, and in public and private space, enjoy a particular set of conditions:

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Community safety [2] – immediate conditions

- Freedom from, and/or reassurance about, a range of real and perceived risks centring on crime, antisocial behaviour, disorder and drug dealing/abuse
- Ability to cope with the consequences of those incidents that people/communities nevertheless experience, at reasonable cost (eg without curtailment of going out)
- Help to cope if unable to do so alone, whether from the community, or more formally eg by victim support/ insurance
- Confidence that the police, CJS and other agencies will if needed provide a responsive, fair and effective service that delivers justice and remedies to the problems they experience or risks perceived
- Trust – within and across cultural boundaries – in neighbours, colleagues and passers-by to support them both morally and materially in terms of sympathy, collectively-upheld moral order, social control and support

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Community safety [3] – wider benefits

- When all these immediate conditions are met to a sufficient degree, they enable individuals, families and, communities to achieve these wider benefits:
  - To pursue the necessities of their cultural, social and economic life
  - To receive adequate services
  - To exercise their skills
  - To enjoy well-being
  - To engage in community life
  - To create wealth in the widest sense
- Where social cohesion and collective efficacy develop, the conditions contribute to
  - The community's *own* capacity to deal with crime and disorder in collaboration with official institutions without making informal social control oppressive, invasive or exclusionary or taking law into own hands
  - The development of sustainable communities more generally

Crime risk assessment

- **Crime risk assessment** (CRA) systematically and rigorously identifies the incoming crime risks ‘out there’ which may face some proposed new entity for which we are responsible:
  - Place (such as a new building)
  - Product (eg a new model of car)
  - Service (eg a new kind of internet delivery service)
  - Business model (eg a new kind of banking)…
  - Or anything else which could become embroiled in crime in some way

What is crime risk?

Crime risk has 3 aspects

Possibility – nature of criminal event

Who does what illegal act to whom/what?

Probability of event

How likely is it to happen?

Harm from event

What is the harm?

When does it happen – immediate or knock-on?

To whom and/or to what?

Information on Risk informs Security

Primary – Eliminate possibility of crime

or if not

Secondary – Reduce probability of criminal events

or if not

Reduce or mitigate harm when events do happen – including propagation of crime

Harm information used for

Setting **priority** in security/safety requirements

Guiding **avoidance** or **mitigation** by design

Crime impact assessment

- **Crime impact assessment** (CIA), like environmental impact assessment, is the counterpart where the focus shifts to considering the criminogenic or criminally harmful consequences of one's *own* proposals
- This is particularly, but not exclusively, relevant to Section 17 of the Crime & Disorder Act England & Wales, which places a statutory duty on a range of local services to do all they can to reasonably prevent crime and disorder in their area
- CIA systematically asks 'how will this action locally affect each of the known causes of crime?'

Community Safety
risk and impact assessments

- These follow the same logic as **crime** risk & impact assessments
- They **include** these, but go further into **harm** (and benefit) in terms of public perception, reassurance, coping etc
- In fact, they can cover impact on both
  - The **immediate conditions** of community safety
  - The **knock-on harms** that the conditions enable or directly cause and the **benefits** they jeopardise

Conflict and competition with other values: Troublesome Tradeoffs

- **Crime prevention and community safety** actions can themselves have further **impacts on other goals**
  - Excessive street-lighting will have a large carbon footprint
  - Fences and shutters may make the place look ugly
  - Poorly-designed security products such as entry systems may be user-unfriendly and exclude elderly or disabled
- These **Troublesome Tradeoffs** are best handled by
  - Clear statement of the underlying values that may be in conflict or competition for resources, leading to
  - Clear brief for designers/architects stating the contradiction for them to resolve through innovation
- **Own goals** – badly-designed crime prevention interventions (such as fortified appearance of buildings/fences) can adversely affect community safety itself eg by raising fear

Tools for risk and impact assessment

- Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity
  - Ground-map of 11 fundamental causes that have to come together for a criminal event to occur
  - Basically, a criminal event happens when a willing and able **offender** encounters, or seeks out, a vulnerable and attractive **target** in the absence of people who are willing and able to **prevent** it, in an **environment** that is conducive to crime

The Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (CCO): immediate causes of criminal events, influencing their risk



Which of these causes might some change (out there, or from our proposal) affect?

Identifying **Possibility** using CCO theory



CCO also describes immediate Context of criminal events



These are treated as **'risk & protective factors'** for crime and should be considered by designers

Which specific crime risks do these objects or systems face?

- CCO is very generalised – to identify risks more closely we need to look at different crime types
- But there are **hundreds** of legal categories of crime – how to tame the variety?
- **Misdeeds & Security Theory**
- This takes the generalities of CCO and focuses them on specific kinds of crime risk and preventive intervention

Misdeeds **& Security –**
Types of criminal behaviour

Mistreatment (damage)

Misappropriation (theft)

Mishandling (eg fraud)

Misuse (eg as tool)

Misbehaviour (nuisance, conflict)

Mistake (false alarm)

Which of these kinds of misdeeds might some change (out there, or from our proposal) affect?

Example – micro scale – street furniture – bike stand

Identifying **Possibility** using CCO and Misdeeds & Security framework together



Crime risks *to* designed object – furniture – bike stand



Crime risks *from* designed object – furniture – bike stand



Crime risks *to* designed object – furniture – bike stand – wrecking – probability




Environment
Accessibility
Space
Content
k factors from context
Can reach stand
Room to operate tools
Resources: stick for lever
In a cluster, one stand may provide leverage or brace against another
Influence of object's design
Physically susceptible to deformation, fracture, uprooting, jamming
Little effort to damage product
Wrecking
Probability of event

Crime risks *from* designed object – furniture – bike stand wrecking – harm



From Risk…. **to** Design

Analysis of **crime risks**
(causes and risk factors)



Guidance for **design response**
(**functional** rather than technical
gives greater design freedom)

Design guidance – stand as object [2]

Mistreatment – deliberate damage as end in itself

Wrecking

Design requirements to reduce <u>probability</u> of undesired events

- **Furniture should not stimulate deliberate damage (eg by appearing weak, provocative or being rewarding to damage eg in terms of enjoyment of exercise of force, sight, shape or sound).**
- **Any mechanism should cause minimum frustration to legitimate users, hence minimise 'machine rage' – both in operation and in failure mode (eg should clearly indicate 'out of order').**
- **Furniture and its components eg locking arms should resist deliberate damage, including by use of readily available hand tools or adventitious implements (eg stones, poles, sticks) including insertion of tools or substances into working parts. *Risk factors:* proximity to supplies of adventitious implements or bracing/leverage points.**
- **Clusters should not give leverage/bracing sites to attack adjacent stands.**
- **Consider all users of the space so non-cyclists don't get hostile to furniture.**
- **Furniture should activate surveillance by calling attention to damage in progress (eg by requirement for conspicuous movement to achieve damage; inherent mechanical noise, or electronic alarm if appropriate).**

Is CSIA an Exact Science?

- Not at all. It can only suggest possible crime and safety consequences of proposed courses of action
- There may often be several alternative risk forecasts although some bets may be more certain than others
- Limitations of criminological theory and of how individual theories interact in specific contexts constrain what can be done
- It is best considered as a means of alerting decision-makers and professional architects and designers to a **range of possible negative consequences** of their proposals, so they can be designed to be robust should any of the more probable and/or the more harmful possibilities occur