WHY CRIME SCIENCE NEEDS BETTER FRAMEWORKS

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What is Crime Science?

• It's not about

 merely tacking on hard science and technology to SCP, POP and criminal investigation

• It is about

- Being applied studying crime so as to prevent it or mitigate harm
- Focusing on the near or proximal causes of criminal events such as opportunities and provocations, rather than traditional concerns with career criminality and more remote societal causes
- Being ready to draw on evidence, theory & scientific method
- Being interested in multidisciplinary applications, conceptions and methods of other sciences ranging from physics to ecology

Challenges for Crime Science

- Working environment
- Organisational
- Operational
- Existential

Needless to say these all overlap, and all relate in some way to how we handle **knowledge** in research and practice

Challenges – Working environment

- Roller-coaster funding and interest in crime science approaches
- Public/ political obsession with cops, courts, corrections
 - Saying 'let me through, I'm a Crime Scientist' doesn't part the crowds
- Cultural resistance in police
 - Efforts to embed POP have had limited success
 - Are police the right organisation to deliver POP, civil or 3rd-party prevention?
- How far ahead of practitioners should the leading edge of Crime Science research and thinking be?
 - Ron Clarke Not too far … right or wrong?
 - Delivery managers have a patronising view of practitioners 'All they can ever understand is a few slogans'... right or wrong?
 - My view risk of stagnation
 - Treat like medical science home first aid guides to brain surgery manuals all based on same underlying frameworks
 - Use modern interactive media to tutor and to guide on-the-job with toolkits

Challenges – Organisational

- Scaling-up communication & collaboration as discipline grows
 - Can ECCA take the strain?
 - Can all of Crime Science continue to be accessible to all its adherents or will there be subdivisions of knowledge domains?
- Handling continuity & change with next generation researchers
 - Inspiration doesn't seem to be a problem
 - But how about knowledge management?
- Training practitioners in diverse fields
 - Practitioners likely to be in post for shorter rather than longer periods
 - Handling simplicity v complexity issue dumb down, long-haul professional training or get smart quick? How to get practitioners to progress beyond the nursery slopes?

Challenges – Operational

- Addressing implementation failure
- Building reliable and durable What-Works knowledge
- Extending our competence
- Computability and simulation of Crime Science concepts – ontology

Operational – Implementation failure

- Demonstration project 'success stories' in crime prevention/ community safety often fail to work when mainstreamed
- Problem-Oriented Policing continues to be hard to implement to high standard
- Underlying these challenges, process knowledge or know-how needs to be better captured, organised and transferred

Implementation failure – Limited process model for prevention

SARA is a good easy-to-learn heuristic but rapidly becomes constraining

- Strong especially on Scanning, Analysis and Assessment, but
- Insufficiently detailed to capture, articulate and organise information for
 - Selection of prior interventions to emulate
 - Replication and (re)design in new contexts
 - Innovation where no prior evidence available
- 'Response' covers huge amount of vital knowledge but is amorphous
- Insufficiently flexible to handle messy complexity of preventive action
- Does not distinguish specific causal mechanisms, generic principles & practical methods

...Like a wardrobe with too few shelves or hangers



Operational – What-Works knowledge

- Reliable What-Works knowledge is available in-principle, but not enough evaluations... never enough?
- Interactions with context challenging for evaluation & research as well as for replication of good practice
- What-Works knowledge (especially Campbell-style effect-size) is usually too narrow to use alone for selection and replication of practice customised to new contexts

Operational – What-Works knowledge

- What-Works knowledge is a wasting asset
 - Arms race with adaptive offenders
 - Social/ technological change
- Need to keep operational knowledge up-to-date weed and regenerate
- Need to distinguish perennial, generic knowledge from evanescent 'here-and-now' knowledge and to know how to distil and test the former via the latter

Operational – What-Works knowledge

Causes and interventions

- Are the 25 Techniques still serviceable?
 - Need to accommodate Precipitation more fully provocations and excuses somewhat tacked on
 - How well do the different technique boxes reflect theoretical mechanisms or are they merely a natural history of methods?
 - Risk, effort, reward are an interchangeable currency does Access Control work by increasing the risk or by causing offender to have to make more effort?

Operational – extending our competence in theory, research and practice

- Crime science started with SCP and POP (plus some research on police investigation and forensics)
- Has begun to address terrorism, wildlife crime
- Should we be planning to extend it more deliberately?
 - Cyber crime
 - Defence security (asymmetric warfare resembles crime)
 - Civil security
- Implications
 - New theory?
 - More, and more diverse, knowledge to manage

Challenges – Existential

- Establishing claim to be science and to be distinct from conventional criminology
 - Should we bother about defining 'crime'?
 - Should we rebuild bridges with criminology, whilst avoiding dilution? Sociological and psychological?
- How does Crime Science relate to
 - 'Security' (whatever that is crime, defence)?
 - Positive perspectives (as with sickness > health, mental illness > happiness) community safety and quality of life?
 - Wider science of cooperation and defection? To understand what crime is and how to prevent it, surely we must relate to this wider frame? (See Schneier, *Liars* and Outliers)
- Terminology
 - 'Vulnerability' used in 4 distinct ways
 - 'Risk' and 'opportunity' weakly defined
 - In practice, loose talk of 'guardians' meaning any kind of preventer, 'deterrence' meaning any kind of preventive mechanism
- Theories in crime science...

Existential – Theories in Crime Science

Basic theories continue to inspire research & practice, but

RAT

- Is it a theory or an ecological truism, a mini-story defining the criminal event and its essential ingredients? Does that matter?
- Do true theories reside in how these come together & how they interact?
- Same applies to CCO but arguably not to Situational Action Theory?

RCT

- Is it an economic discourse as much as a theory?
- Emotional mechanisms may underlie rational choice

Pattern theory

All theories explain patterns! Needs a new name to reflect what it's about

CPTED

- Out on a conceptual and empirical limb
- Concepts are very muddled and overlapping

Existential – Theories in Crime Science

- The individual CS theories are poorly integrated
- Each has own terminology and discourse (RAT ecological, RCT economic, Precipitation psychological, PT geographic) and often these are not very precise
- They overlap and don't quite join up, not good for handling interactions and emergence
- How clear are they for computability ontology issue?
- Don't seem to be generating new theory (or are they?)
- While individual theories are simple, whole corpus is a tangle

Existential – Theories in Crime Science

- Practitioners (and novice researchers) are dropped into this tangle and left to cope by inventing their own makeshift interpretations
- The Problem Analysis Triangle tries to bring things together heuristically for practitioners – easy to communicate and learn but
 - Under-emphasises Offender factors important even for designing Situational interventions
 - Not clear on methods/mechanisms distinction
 - Misses out on important elements of crime problem/ event
 - Tacks on the preventer roles in an inflexible way
 - Not easy to expand it to organise progressive detail (eg PAT > PAT + preventers... > + supercontrollers
- These characteristics constrain how researchers and theorists think too, and are not 'leading edge'

PROBLEM

Target/victim



Knowledge as a cause of the problem

- Many causes of implementation failure, but interested in those centring on knowledge
- Limitations of practice knowledge and how it's captured, consolidated, evaluated and transferred, has implications for practice, delivery, policy
- Fragmentation of CP field into Situational and Offender-Oriented interventions, implemented through very different institutions
- Fragmentation within domains such as SCP, with 3 poorly-integrated theories and suites of terms
- Failure to address rich, messy complexity of crime prevention, extreme context-dependency of what works, and Heraclitean world of social/technological change and adaptive offenders
- Instead, several alternative strategies, equally maladaptive
 - Pervasive faith that simplicity is all you need to get practitioners doing it right;
 and all that practitioners can take so slogans, checklists, limited career paths
 - Rigid adherence to procedures and prescriptions programme fetishism
 - Surrender to ineffability of crime prevention

Organising our Knowledge

- Have shown problems with current ways of organising our knowledge
- As our knowledge grows, we need even better ways to store and retrieve it for research and practice
- Alternatives being designed and developed in an explicit way and for an explicit purpose

Organising our Knowledge

- The purpose of crime prevention knowledge in an applied context is
- Improving, sustaining and extending performance
- Feeding, extending and testing theory and research

Knowledge – strategic concepts

Appropriate complexity

- Theories as simple as possible but no simpler (Einstein)
- Add a little, structured complexity to help practitioners handle vast complexity of real world (Ashby) which they daily have to address
- Add underlying structure to live with complexity (Norman)

Articulating knowledge & concepts

- Tacit knowledge (Polanyi, Tilley) hard to transfer
- Unclear or conflicting discourses are blunt tools for thinking and communication nationally/ internationally

Backwards compatible with existing frameworks, but improving on them

e.g. SARA, Crime Triangle

Integrated approach

Incorporating full range of interventions - situational and offender-oriented – and institutional contexts

Supporting both impact and process evaluation

What works.... and what is workable/deliverable

Supporting both capture and application of practice knowledge

- 'Record' and 'Playback'

Replication as innovation

- Every context is different (Tilley)
- Copy the process not the product (Blackmore)
- Importance of causal mechanisms how it works (Pawson, Tilley)

Practitioners as consultants not technicians

Investing to deliver (Homel)

 Better education, guidance, career structure, infrastructure based on more sophisticated concepts leads to better performance




Domains of Crime Prevention Knowledge

- Know crime definitions of offences
- Know-about crime problems causes, consequences, context
- Know-what works to reduce crime
- Know-who to involve
- **Know-when** to act relative to other initiatives
- Know-where to distribute resources
- **Know-why** symbolism, values, politics, ethics
- Know-how to put into practice

Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity Know-about, know-what works

- Analytic/synthetic an attempt to organise causes and interventions by Principles reflecting mechanisms, and Methods
- Unifies the classic theories albeit still an ecological truism
- Covers agents and entities and formers' perceptions and interactions with each other and with the latter
- Generalises and offers more flexibility eg preventer roles cover handlers, guardians, managers, designers, installers and more
- Richer
 - Adds more roles eg promoter, and entities eg resources for offending, enclosure
 - Covers offender side in greater depth
- Tighter terminology more computable
- Organises knowledge around principles



Extending our reach – CCO in Cyberspace

Target

Information, IT system

Target enclosure

Firewall

Environment

IT/ financial system

Preventer

Intelligent software

Offender resources

Malicious software

Offender presence

Remote hacker

Currently working up research on insider threats in ICT systems

Know-about – The roles people play in crime situations eg bike theft from student housing

'Civil' roles

- Owner/user of bike
- Flatmate
- Other user of building
- Landlord
- Visitor
- Meter reader
- ...?

Crime-specific roles

- Offender
- Preventer
- Promoter

Civil roles & crime roles overlap, eg

- User, flatmate, visitor, landlord could be preventer or promoter
- Visitor or neighbour could be offender...

Capturing dynamics – know-about – Developing Cornish Scripts concept

- CCO = anatomy of causes, we also need physiology
- In situations which people repeatedly encounter eg parking/storing bike they learn which actions work best
- Result of this learning is a script structured sequence of things to attend to, and things to do/avoid, in achieving some purpose or goal/s
- Scripts may be associated with particular roles with crime, these are
 offenders (the familiar approach but also) preventers, promoters
- User/preventer script:


Find house, park bike, go to room, return, find bike, exit, use


Abuser/offender script:


Seek house with bike, see, gain entry to hall, release bike, take bike, escape, sell

Even more dynamic – script *clashes* – Know-about and know-what

- Roles may have conflicting goals, causing tactical script clashes – archetypical pivots
 - Surveill v conceal
 - Exclude v permit entry
 - Wield force v resist it
 - Challenge suspect v give plausible explanation
 - Surprise/ambush v warning
 - Pursue v escape...
- Preventer's task is to arrange the situation to favour the user over the abuser in each of these clashes in terms of the shifting dynamics of risk of harm, effort, reward – so the story ends with the bad guy losing!







Further Applications for the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity

- Organised crime/ drug dealing
- Terrorism
- Design Against Crime crime proofing of products
- Crime Impact Assessment/ Risk Assessment
- Horizon scanning
- Offender interviews
- Investigation of crime
- Understanding / describing Modus Operandi

Complementary know-what mechanism focus – How interventions act on offender

- Experience with Hostile Reconnaissance toolkit suggests 25 Techniques and more can be organised in terms of principles centred on the offender
- Could call this the offender's eye view of CCO

DEFLECT / DIRECT

perpetrators towards/away from place or behaviour.

DISCOURAGE

perpetrator perceives effort too great, reward too little, relative to risk, so abandons/aborts attempt.

DECEIVE

perpetrator acts on wrong information on risk, effort, reward, where to go etc, and is exposed to immediate arrest or protracted intelligence collection, frustrated, or mistakenly decides not to select this site as target.

DEMOTIVATE

awakening, within perpetrator, motives/emotions contrary to the mission, e.g. empathy with potential victims.

DEFEAT / DELAY

physically block access and movement or block/obscure the information that the perpetrator wants to collect.

DETER-KNOWN

perpetrator knows what the risk of exposure is, and judges it unacceptable, so abandons/ aborts reconnaissance attempt.

DETER-UNKNOWN

perpetrator is rendered uncertain what control methods they are up against, so again judge risk of exposure unacceptable.

DISABLE / DENY

equipment helpful to perpetrators such as cameras.

DISCONCERT


causing perpetrator to make involuntary movement or otherwise to become startled.

DETAIN

once perpetrators detected, they must be caught and held subject to legal powers (or at least, credible identifying details must be obtained so they can be traced).

DETECT

facilitate detection of perpetrator by: arranging environment and procedures to make them more likely to betray perpetrators' illegal intentions; making the actions of legitimate visitors more distinctive; briefing staff on what is normal behavior; and training staff to detect suspicious behavior, and how to




Impact – beyond effect size Know-what works

- To help program delivery managers and practitioners select actions to replicate, a multi-dimensional evaluation needed:
 - Are actions effective or cost-effective?
 - Do anticipated benefits significantly outweigh costs/ risks?
 - Are there any serious undesirable side-effects?
 - Are actions responsive? Can they be efficiently targeted on causes of crime problem? Can they
 be efficiently prioritised on basis of harm from crime, needs of victim & wider society?
 - Are actions legitimate and acceptable to community?
 - Are actions sustainable in effectiveness, financial, and human resource terms?
 - Are actions adaptable proofed against social/ technological change and adaptive offenders?
 - Are actions implementable with acceptable level of risk, given context and available resources?
- To aid replication and innovation:
 - Realistic evaluation of impact
 - Detailed process evaluation considering tradeoffs and interactions with context which leads us to....

Know-How

Crime prevention practice knowledge

- Practitioners need guidance on
 - defining problem
 - selection
 - replication and
 - Innovation
- Trying to improve on SARA



<u>5ls</u>

Know-how — The task streams of the Preventive Process



From SARA to 51s

SARA 5Is

Scanning Intelligence


Analysis Intervention


Response Implementation

Assessment Involvement


Impact

5ls – Zoom Structure – Intelligence






- General social/geographical context
- Evidence of crime problem sources of information and analysis
- The crime problem/s tackled pattern, trend, offenders, MO
- Wider crime probler
- Consequences of the crime problem/s
- Immediate causes, risk & protective factors, criminal careers





5ls: Zoom structure – Involvement



Wider uses for 5ls project information

Beyond capturing good practice examples:

- Synthesis/testing of principles and theories
- Toolkits and training
- Failure-mode analysis at each 'l'
- Supporting gap analyses for research, and strategic overviews for policy and delivery
- Prospective business-planning/appraising tool, for project development and implementation – 'playback' as well as 'record'

The Question of Simplicity in these frameworks

- Simplicity preferred, but...
- Crime prevention/ community safety are complex
- Einstein As simple as possible but no simpler
- Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety to understand complexity in reality, you
 have to have sufficient complexity in your model.
- So: It's futile dumbing down to communicate with practitioners, if what you communicate can't deliver successful prevention. Or provide adequate foundation for research
- Any complexity must be appropriate and deliberate
- Language must be sophisticated but communicable
- 5Is tackles this by Zoom Structure... and will use more communications design techniques for V.2
- Interactive graphical version a possibility
- 5ls is best learned as primary schema for prevention

Equipping Practitioners – Technicians or Professional Consultants?

- Rather than supply practitioners with many fixed solutions,
 better to equip them with generic principles of community safety
 and knowledge of process
- Should help practitioners think less like technicians applying a simple prepackaged remedy; and more like expert consultants/designers, using principles to customise to context, to innovate, design and reconfigure diagnoses and solutions as they go
- But both kinds of practice valid in different circumstances according to simplicity/ complexity of crime problem tackled
- Need developmental pathway from heuristics to first principles

Finally...

- High investment in training, guidance and other infrastructure and capacity building leads to High return in successful performance of crime prevention/ community safety/ Problem-Oriented Policing
- Leading-edge theory and research needed to feed this process – we can't hold ourselves back for practitioners, but we can make it easier for them to be more sophisticated

Where to Find Information on Crime Frameworks

http://5isframework.wordpress.com www.designagainstcrime.com/crimeframeworks

Ekblom, P (2011) Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety with the 5Is Framework

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Please send comments, suggest improvements or participate in development!

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