

Spanning the gap between crime, terrorism and security – developing a toolkit for complex stations

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Paul Ekblom & Andrew Newton (presenters)

Applied Criminology & Policing Centre, University of Huddersfield, UK

Full project team: Rachel Armitage, James Bray, Kris Christmann, Paul Ekblom, Eloise Keating, Leanne Monchuk, Andrew Newton, Simon Parkinson, Michelle Rogerson and Daiyaan Shreef

History: Project Pre-Empt 1




- In 2014, EU DG Mobility & Transport asked us to identify 'best practice' solutions to secure complex stations from terrorist attacks and serious crime
- Developed an approach based on Mixed Methods and a practically and Scientifically Realistic approach to knowledge

Conceptual Attack Framework



- ☐ Mapped out theoretically plausible **attacks:** *Methods Weapons Targets Scripts*
- Mapped theoretically plausible security responses
- Organised detailed **findings** from literature, fieldwork on **knowledge trees**
- ☐ All brought together under a **conceptual attack framework**





Conceptual Attack Framework – based on CCO and

University of HUDDERSFIELD

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Attack Procedure






Toolkit approach




The approach to the toolkit was to develop a process which empowers users to: Think **perpetrator**, and think **threat** Think **risk** for terrorism/crime, generated by design and operation of the station Think **security** – prevention and first response (Protect and Prepare) Think designer, and the wider requirements for business, users and society Think manager Think **future** – resilience and adaptability in the longer term Toolkit had to be adaptable to diverse user levels, contexts, functions

Indicative Toolkit – where Phase 1 ended








Pre-Empt 2 (2017-18) - Toolkit Realisation



- ☐ As per Indicative Toolkit but:
 - **□** Fully interactive
 - Terrorism PLUS multiple crime types
 - □ In 15 EU languages
 - **□** Adding local regulatory context
 - ☐ In 11 months
- ☐ FFS!!!




At the Heart of the Toolkit - work in progress



Reducing risk by matching security actions to the threat

Threat from Perpetrators





At the Heart of the Toolkit - work in progress







Done on an Attack Method x Zone-by-Zone basis across station




- Users focus on a singleAttack Method at a time
- Users can create **Zones** within the station that are relevant to this Attack
 Method, and work through these in sequence




What is the Threat? Think Perpetrator





In more detail – Threat – the underlying engine not seen by user



Offender actions


Realisation



Attack Method


Chose Zone

- ☐ Toolkit prompts user with categories of Perpetrator action
- User responds by entering a local **instantiation** of the action




Perpetrator action
Motivated by, Exploiting
tactically or engendering
Harm via >


In more detail – Risk attributes of human Targets located in Zone 'Entrance A'




Realisation – Zone Risk Attributes

- This records user's choices in planning for Offender's actions, targets, weapons, exploitable hazards; intent and level of motivation
- This presents list of pre-prepared risk attributes of Target &
 Zone, for the Attack
 Method in question user checks those which apply and fills in box with local detail






Example – Instantiated Security Actions to counter instantiated Risk Attributes




To address each instantiated RA of Target and of Zone, select candidate Security Actions from suggested listing against that RA, and then instantiate those Security actions





Realisation – Selecting/ instantiating candidate Security Actions on basis of risk attributes, and existing security massuras in Zana



Change Language

Realisation – Summary of user choices

Session Overview

Review all your sections

Crime Type

Terrorist Attack

Vehicle rampage

Entrance A

Targets

- · Passengers/visitors -
- · Queue outside Smiths newsagent -

Perpetrator Actions

• Approach Zone boundary in vehicle - Approach via taxi rank

Risk attributes

- Zone boundaries/barriers easily breached in vehicle Weak bollards
- Zone allows easy vehicular movement to/from it Easy access from taxi lane
- Zone allows easy vehicular movement within it Low kerbs easily surmounted

Security Action

 Increase standoff distance - 1. Add bollards beside taxi lane 2. Raise kerb beside taxi lane approach

Issues still to develop



- Selecting candidate security actions
 - ☐ Effectiveness, Evidence, Harm, Prioritisation, Cost

☐ Which is us when project finished?



Selecting security actions to

What Security Interventions to select?

Selecting security actions to

