## UCL DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY & CRIME SCIENCE



# Dawes Centre Al Sandpit

## Some frameworks for thinking about Al

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http://5isframework.wordpress.com

www.designagainstcrime.com/methodology-resources/crime-frameworks

## Coming up




- How to anticipate crime implications of innovations
- How to think about the roles people and organisations play in (future) crime
- 3 perspectives in time and space

## How to anticipate with innovations such as AI?




Can take different perspectives on future crime/ security

- Causal v functional
  - Causal e.g. how might this innovation generate stress or conflict?
  - Functional how might this innovation serve criminal or security purposes?
- Within functional
  - Demand-side focus what do criminals or security need to be invented, to solve their problems/ complete an opportunity? Is any specific requirement holding them back?
  - Supply-side focus what can this new piece of science or technology do for criminals or security?




## Function – generic demand-side – offenders' needs






## Function – generic demand-side – offenders






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## **Example – supply – what can Drones do for Crime/ Security?**



Functional essence of Drone

Active, mobile, effective telepresence of human agency

#### Detail

Remote operation - can go to and do in different places from humans in general, individual agents in particular... remoteness can range from metres to many km... Allows distancing of agent from hazards, tracing by traditional means eg facial recognition

Mobility and agility in different modes - air, land surface, walls, water

Different size/shape/body configurability from agent - entry/exit, detectability eg through size/shape/disguise

Communication with agent - coded/encrypted

Sensors - human + more - inc Radar

Image capture, transmission, recording

Image interpretation

Autonomy at various levels from tactical to more operational... navigation, risk and objective identification, decision, response

Ease of operation/ limited training by user

Conveyance of goods to/from destination

Actuation


Self-defence v threats/protection v natura/ accidental human hazards

Generic regulatory requirements - eg licensing, identification, constraints on flight eg line-of-sight operation, no-fly zones

Cheap

## Supply – what can Al do for Crime/ Security?





## Function – supply-side – <u>Al</u> can be:



#### **Tool for criminals**

- Misused in perpetrator techniques
- Misbehaved with vandalism, nuisance
- Misled, Misdirected spoofing

## Target of crime


- Misappropriated stolen
- Mistreated harmed
- Mishandled false licence
- Misbegotten counterfeit/pirated version

## Aligned with security

- Secured against above risks
- Exploited to control crime surveillance, detection, pursuit
- Proofed vs Mistakes & Mishaps false alarms, accusation


## Thinking about crime roles – who is involved with crime, how? • UCL






## Thinking about crime roles






## **Crime X Civil/ legitimate roles**






## **Crime X Civil/ legitimate roles**





## 3 perspectives in time and space – Eco-Devo-Evo





## **Addressing tactical Script Clashes**



We can identify tactical clashes between offenders and security

Wield force v resist Take v keep Snoop v (Damage v protect, maintain privacy Confront v avoid Injure v keep intact) Pursue v escape Surprise/ ambush v Act at will v be alert Trap v elude control misbehaviour Challenge suspect v Conceal criminal intent v Conceal traces and give plausible response detect tracks v detect Surveill v conceal

- These clashes
  - Influence criminal plans and outcomes
  - are generic and perennial will always need to be faced
- Innovations can disrupt the balance of these clashes, and favour one side over other – which side will gain from a sudden breakthrough?
- We must design things to advantage the good side
- Approaches to inventiveness like TRIZ highlight these contradictions, and also identify evolutionary trends in invention

## Handling civil-world tradeoffs & conflicts



- What's stopping us from making the future favour security?
- Various broader design contradictions can hold back exploitation of current/future technologies by the security side (offenders are less constrained):

,	Security and	
Sustainability	Convenience	Market freedom
		Tours to 0
Health & safety	Privacy	Trust & collective efficacy
Freedom of		
movement	Aesthetics	Social inclusivity
Generic technological contradictions e.g. strength v weight, functionality v power consumption		

- Will innovations relax, bypass, or tighten these contradictions?
- Can we steer them in beneficial directions, or at least be ready with mitigations?

## Massaging the tradeoffs – desirable techno trends



- **Tunability** of materials, applications, for optimisation to diverse contexts
  - What works' in crime prevention is very context-dependent

#### Smart discriminator functions

- What's good for legitimate users (e.g. Smaller, lighter, more portable, more durable, cheaper, easier to operate) is good for thieves
- How to serve one while thwarting the other?

## • Adaptable, reconfigurable form

- Modelled on swing down fire escapes –
  both configurable and discriminating
- Creative leap rather than compromise
  - Internal combustion engine enabled armour and mobility

