

Framing crime prevention, capturing knowledge – 5Is and beyond



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What we can teach Master's Students

- Given the interest in developing a Master's in crime prevention, this is a quick tour of some of the frameworks, definitions etc available for teaching students, developed by myself and others
- The frameworks can support
 - **Foundation learning**, giving structure and clarity to knowledge of crime and crime prevention
 - **Professional guidance** on-the-job, in decision-making and commissioning, designing, managing and evaluating projects/services
 - A way of organising and structuring **detailed practice knowledge**

What we can teach Master's Students

- The frameworks can help
 - Acquisition and sharing of **knowledge**
 - **Thinking**
 - **Communication** (national and international)
 - **Action and innovation** in the field
- As a professional discipline develops, the frameworks should also evolve under the selection pressures of utility and usability:
 - Are they **useful** – do they add value and amplify the capacity of the practitioner or researcher?
 - Are they **usable** – can people learn and apply them?

Kinds of knowledge research & evaluation can supply

- **Know-about** crime problems
- **Know-what** works to reduce crime/ increase safety
- **Know-who** to involve
- **Know-when** to act
- **Know-where** to distribute resources
- **Know-why** — symbolism, values, politics, ethics
- **Know-how** to put into practice

Technical elements of crime prevention knowledge

- **Concepts and definitions** – know all
- **Process models** – know how
- **Causal and risk models** – know about
- **Interventions** – know what works
- **Institutional settings** – know who
- **Evaluation** – know how to know what works

Concepts and definitions

- Many of these are vague and overlapping

**Crime
prevention**

**Community
safety**

Security

Partnership

Scripts

Script clashes

Opportunity

Climate setting


Harm

Risk

Definitions in depth

- Definitions are tools for thinking and communication
- There's little point developing clear 'top-level' definitions if they rest on subsidiary concepts that are themselves ill-defined or, taken as a suite, inconsistent

Know-crime – What is crime risk? Definition in depth




What is crime prevention?

- Crime prevention seeks to reduce the risk of criminal events by intervening in their causes or risk factors. It seeks to

Eliminate possibility of crime
or if not

Reduce probability of criminal events
or if not

Reduce or mitigate harm when events do happen - including propagation of crime



Know about causes of criminal events
Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity

Know-about risks – Misdeeds & Security framework

- For **identifying more specific crime risks and crime prevention opportunities** from any new product or service
- Can the product or service be
 - **Misappropriated** (stolen)
 - **Mistreated** (damaged, injured)
 - **Mishandled** (stolen goods, smuggled...)
 - **Misbegotten** (counterfeit)
 - **Misused** (as tool or weapon for crime)
 - **Misbehaved** with (for ASB)
 - **Mistaken** (false alarm, false arrest)

Know-about risk factors – selection of terrorist targets

- Risk factors for **Mistreatment** in service of terrorism
 - Exposed
 - Vital
 - Iconic
 - Legitimate
 - Destructible
 - Occupied
 - Near
 - Easy

Clarke and Newman

Know about – dynamics of criminal events

- **Scripts**

- Organised sequence of actions leading towards **desired goals** and avoiding **undesired** ones (e.g. seek target, approach, deliver bomb...)
- Those controlling/preventing crime/terrorism have scripts too (e.g. In carrying out surveillance or access control)

- **Script clashes**

- Surveill v conceal
- Exclude v permit entry
- Wield force v resist it
- Conceal criminal intent v detect criminal intent
- Challenge suspect v give plausible response
- Surprise/ambush v warning
- Trap v elude
- Pursue v escape...

- **Prevention** aims to tip balance in favour of good guys

Know-about – Causal properties of environment –

- These **‘primitive’** properties of environment **help or hinder** goals **of user/abuser**, influence their **perception/ motivation/ emotion**, and affect outcomes of **social interaction**
 - Space
 - Movement
 - Manipulation/force
 - Perception/prospect
 - Shelter/refuge
 - Understandability
 - Information
 - Motivation/emotion (territoriality, fear)

Know-about – Structural/technical features of environment that influence users & abusers


- **Structural Features**
 - Nodes (destinations)
 - Paths
 - Barriers (physical, visual)
 - Screens
 - Enclosures
 - Gates/doors
 - Furniture (stands, hooks...)
 - Lighting
 - Signage
 - Surfaces – decoration

- **Movable content**

- Vehicles
- People's bodies
- Containers
- Coats on hooks

- **Materials**

- Surfaces
- Bulk



Know what – principles of prevention – generic

Know what – the 11Ds

- Focus on how interventions work by **influencing offender** in particular
- Beyond the 25 techniques of situational prevention

Defeat	physically block access and movement or block/obscure the information that the perpetrator wants to collect
Deflect / Direct	perpetrators towards/away from place or behaviour
Deter-Known	perpetrator knows what the risk of exposure is, and judges it unacceptable so abandons/aborts PHR attempt
Deter-Unknown	perpetrator uncertain what control methods he's up against, so again judges risk of exposure unacceptable
Discourage	perpetrator perceives effort too great, reward too little, relative to risk, so abandons/aborts attempt
Demotivate	awakening, within perpetrator, motives/emotions contrary to the mission, e.g. empathy with potential victims, removing excuses, coward image
Disconcert	causing perpetrator to make involuntary movement or otherwise to become startled
Detect	passive, and active exposure to make perpetrator self-reveal by instrumental, expressive or involuntary action; by making legitimate presence/behaviour distinctive; and by improving capacity of people exercising security role to detect
Detain	once perpetrators detected, they must be caught and held (or at least, credible identifying details must be obtained so they can be traced)
Disable / Deny	equipment helpful to perpetrators such as bugs or cameras
Deceive	perpetrator acts on wrong information on risk, effort, reward, where to go etc, and is exposed to immediate arrest or protracted intelligence collection, frustrated, or falsely decides not to select this site as target

Know-what – Security Function Framework – description/specification of design of products and places

- Purpose

What crime problem/s does the design address?

- Niche

How does the product fit within the ecology of security?


- Mechanism

How does the product work in preventing crime?


- Technology

How is the product realised so as to support the preventive mechanisms and address all other purposes?

Know-How – 5Is process model of crime prevention



Know-how – components of a Support Delivery System



Know-what-plus: Knowledge Framework for Policy Choice - *Multiple Dimensions of Policy Performance*

- Selecting interventions that are **effective, cost-effective and whose benefit significantly outweighs cost**
- Efficient **targeting on causes** of crime/ safety problem
- **Prioritisation on harm, needs** of victim & wider society
- **Coverage** on the ground – how much of crime problem tackled?
- **Scope** – narrow range or broad range of crime types tackled?
- **Adaptability** – proofed v soc/ tech change/ adaptive offenders
- Taking action over **appropriate timescales**
- Pursuing policies **sustainable** financially and in HR terms
- Avoiding undesirable **side-effects** of action and balancing **tradeoffs** with other policy values
- Maximising **legitimacy/ acceptability** of actions
- Ensuring policies are **deliverable** in rollout of programmes

Big question

- Do these frameworks help or hinder those learning or practising crime prevention?
 - Do they make life too complicated for them?
 - Or do they help them handle the messiness and complexity of practical crime prevention out there in the real world?

Complexity revisited – (1) Rocket science?

The claim that crime prevention is ‘not rocket science’ can be turned on its head.

The science and the underlying technical principle of rocketry are actually *dead simple* – feed fuel and oxidant into a chamber, stand well back, ignite, apply Newton’s laws of motion, and whoosh!

What *is* difficult are the detailed, practical engineering and control systems required to reach the sky alive and not plough into a nearby hillside. Just like crime prevention.

(2) Donald Norman Oct 2010

Living With Complexity

“When complexity is unavoidable, when it mirrors the complexity of the world or of the tasks that are being done, then it is excusable, understandable, and learnable.

But when things are complicated, when the complexity is the result of poor design with completely arbitrary steps, with no apparent reason, then the result is perplexing, confusing, and frustrating.”

(3) Last word from a practitioner

“5Is is difficult, but worth the frown-time”

*My aim is to develop an interactive online toolkit to help practitioners learn, use and benefit from 5Is and other frameworks – to get the **gain** without the **pain***