Teasing apart Territoriality…

and reassembling it as a useful concept

for practice, research and theory

DESIGN AGAINST CRIME

DaC

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What's coming up

1. Reminder of CPTED
2. CPTED – limitations and problems – the need for an upgrade
3. Designing the upgrade – a specification
4. Rethinking territoriality
5. Discourses
   - Generic issues
   - Definitions for all core CPTED concepts, incl Territoriality
6. Territoriality explored in more depth
7. Social and cultural dimension considered

CPTED – A Reminder

Defining CPTED:
an 'Official' Version

"The proper design and effective use of the built environment that can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime and an improvement in the quality of life.

The goal of CPTED is to reduce opportunities for crime that may be inherent in the design of structures or in the design of neighborhoods."

Crowe 2001

CPTED – Basic Principles

CPTED Theory

- **Defensible Space**
  - Capacity of physical environment to create perceived zones of territorial influence
  - Capacity of physical design to provide surveillance opportunities for residents and their agents
  - Capacity of design to influence perception of a project's uniqueness, isolation, and stigma
  - Influence of 'safe zones' in adjacent areas
- **Situational Crime Prevention**
  - Manipulate environment to increase risk, effort and guilt for offending, decrease reward & provocation
- **Environmental criminology, pattern theory etc**
  - Crime attractors, generators; activity nodes,paths,edges
- **Broken Windows**
  - Failure to maintain environment precipitates and provides opportunity for crime

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Does CPTED work?

Overall conclusion of Cozens' 2005 review

- Cautious **YES**…

- **But**

  – Support for the effectiveness of **comprehensive** CPTED programmes has not been **unequivocally** demonstrated

  – Uncertain precisely how CPTED and its component parts work, where it works best and how to systematically evaluate its effectiveness beyond reasonable doubt

  – Rigorous testing & evaluation procedure to produce deeper understanding of theoretical basis of CPTED mechanisms

  – **Can't do that until we have a far clearer statement of its working principles**

CPTED –
Problems & Limitations

CPTED – Overview of problems

- Weak **definition** & unclear **scope** leave it prone to fashion and drift of meaning, and to meaning different things to different agencies/disciplines
  - *Eg shift to 'hard security' & away from public space (Zahm) – do we want this?*

- 'In a disciplinary No Man's Land':
  - Isolated from criminology
  - Isolated from design/architecture
  - ***Opportunity** to carve out new interdisciplinary territory, but **risks** starvation of new ideas & developments in these areas*

- Lacks a decent **Process** model – we know little about **how** CPTED is done in the field
  - *Until we do, it's hard for researchers to help improve practice*

CPTED Problems – Isolation from Criminology and Crime Prevention

- Problems with **individual principles** of CPTED

  - territoriality may not be universal – cultural context important

- Contradictions **between** CPTED principles - eg **surveillance v territoriality**

- Detailed **criminological evidence base** needs developing on specific risks of crime which CPTED seeks to tackle, and what interventions work in what contexts

  - Broken windows theory, while very plausible, only partially supported by research; but uncritically accepted by practitioners

- CPTED also carries **historical baggage**
  - Principles and theories not integrated
  - Bad for Knowledge Management

CPTED Problems –
Isolation from Design and Architecture

- CPTED sometimes fails to consider **whole system**, humans and all, not just physical aspect

- **CP** often set **against** other design principles eg permeability/ accessibility, when **design** should be about creative optimisation of *all* relevant values/benefits

- Many police users of CPTED in *practice* see 'design' as a set of physical **products/buildings**. It should also be seen as a **process** – a way of doing and thinking - which applies to all kinds of crime prevention, imparting a design perspective and design approach

Security versus New Urbanism?

- Police say:
  - **New Urbanism** will increase crime
  - Surveillance is not a substitute for defensible space
- Examples
  - **Car parking** – New Urbanism wants *less* – but cars out of view, possible conflict among residents on parking space
  - **Cul-de-sacs** - are they *safer* than open streets?
- Conflicting **values**
  - *Principles* of enclosure/ defensible space/ territoriality & permeability
  - Serve respective *values* of security, and access & movement
- Conflicting **research results**
  - Space Syntax – cul-de-sacs less safe than integrated streets
  - BCS – cul-de-sacs safer
  - Armitage – leakiness of cul-de-sacs important

CPTED Problems – Weak Process Model & Research

- Within CPTED, **process model** is underdeveloped.
  - Designation (specify place)
  - Definition (specify problem)
  - Design (create solution)
  - … But that is as far as the conceptualisation of design goes
- **Process research** is missing
  - CPTED not just about theoretical/conceptual issues, but also about applied processes involving designers, design decisionmakers and users which (a) we don't understand, and (b) seem likely in practice to operate in very variable ways (Ted Kitchen)

CPTED Limitations – Rigidity

- CPTED can be used rigidly or flexibly, but practitioners with elementary training risk the first, which can be costly or likely to discredit the approach
  - Failure to fit context – airport car park condemned for lights being too low. Cookbook copying won't work anyway
  - Failure to adapt to users

CPTED Limitations – Rigidity

- Adaptable criminals – countermoves, new tools and techniques to exploit environment, even shape it in their favour

- Failure of designers to anticipate

False security from rigid prescription + adaptable criminals? 'Helpful' entrance porch

Beware cookbook copying – Importance of context for replication

ELECTRONICALLY SECURED CYCLE PARKING

GHENT, BELGIUM

WALTHAMSTOW CENTRAL STATION, LONDON

Troublesome Tradeoffs

Can we design secure places in-context without jeopardising their main purpose and:

- Convenience

- Aesthetics - fortress society

- Legal and ethical norms - privacy and freedom – CCTV?

- Social inclusion

- Sustainable environment

- Safety

CPTED Limitations – Neglects Wider Social Context

- Efficacy of CPTED can be reduced (or increased) by **demographic** factors (eg high densities of young people) and **socio-economic** factors. Social conditions may nurture fear, reduce inclination to intervene and result in withdrawal of people into home, which becomes heavily fortified

- Realisation of this was one of reasons behind creation of **Second Generation CPTED** in late 1990s

Second Generation CPTED (1)

Focus on

- Social activities and social mix needed to encourage neighbours to take ownership of space & take advantage of natural surveillance

- Community (sub)culture

- Cohesion / social capital

- Connectivity / accessibility as much as defensibility

Youth Shelter – designing for living space plus inclusion – Second Generation concept?

Second Generation CPTED (2)

Important issues raised, and design cannot neglect social factors, but:

- Not all social interactions are positive – conformity pressure, conflict

- Are 'mixed use, mixed people' conditions always beneficial? Need **evidence** base and clarification of **values** underlying our stance

- Risk of flip from extreme of simplistic architectural determinism to dilution with vague social ideas

- **We must ensure those social ideas are *not* vague!**

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Upgrading CPTED

Specification to improve CPTED's fitness for purpose

- Clearer definition & scope of CPTED – clarify meaning of 'design'
- Better links to source disciplines – planning, design, architecture, policing, criminology, risk management…
- Strategic features
  - Scientific – evidence-based and theory-based
  - Adaptive
  - Scale- and context-sensitive
  - Creatively balance values and priorities within crime/safety & with other values
  - Professionalism – expertise, quality assurance, ethics
  - Good Process model for applying know-how
  - Futures-oriented – world out there, & CPTED technology

Realising the specification

- Range of suggestions to meet this specification

  – www.designagainstcrime.com/files/Ekblom_CPTED_Stockholm_08.pdf

- Presentation on **surveillance**

  – www.designagainstcrime.com/files/Paul_Ekblom_surveillance.pdf

- New **definition** of CPTED

- And work on **discourses and definitions of components**

A New Definition of CPTED?

CPTED is:

- Reducing the probability of crime & related problems, and their consequent harm, and enhancing the quality of life through community safety

- By using the processes of planning and design of the environment

- On a range of scales and types of place from individual buildings and interiors to wider landscapes, neighbourhoods & cities

- To produce designs that are 'fit for purpose', and contextually appropriate in all other respects

- Whilst achieving a balance between

  – the efficiency of avoiding crime problems *before* construction

  – and the *adaptability* of tackling them through subsequent management and maintenance

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Territoriality

Territoriality is central to CPTED…

- But **poorly defined**, so we can't
  - Readily spot weaknesses in design relating to territoriality
  - Positively design for territoriality
  - Monitor & adjust mechanisms of prevention (how they work)
  - Clarify values
  - Undertake subtle & innovative tradeoffs with values **outside** security eg tradeoff between permeability and defensible space
  - Likewise handle tradeoffs and conflicts **within** security eg territoriality v surveillance (walls keep people out but block vision)
  - Understand the subtle **cultural & subcultural** interpretations and dynamics at different **ecological levels** (individual, household, community) that influence how it is implemented & accepted, & how it might go wrong (negative side-effects)

Territoriality is central to CPTED…

- We don't even have a clear understanding of the **discourses** through which Territoriality and the other core CPTED concepts are expressed – and the discourses differ
- Before cultural and sociological perspectives can be applied (whether as contribution or challenge),
  - Territoriality has to be defined and its discourse sorted out
  - Due to interrelationships & overlaps between them, same is needed for other CPTED concepts

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Discourses – what *kinds* of concept and language used in CPTED?

- All 6 core concepts of CPTED are entangled and overlap, hence to understand Territoriality we have to understand much of the rest

- Need to deconstruct them and develop **definitions in depth** so the 'buried connections' between the concepts can be exposed to view

- Those definitions all need to be in a common discourse and draw on same set of subsidiary concepts/elements

- **Should form a firm basis for exploring the more subtle and complex social aspects of CPTED**

Discourses – use of language and concepts

- Many ways to describe **preventive interventions** – no single best one – best if done deliberately and reflectively rather than unconsciously drifting between them
  - **Functional** – purpose – serving user, delivering crime prevention, community safety
  - **Problem-oriented** – functional but tackling specific crime in specific place
  - **Performance** – purpose + target criteria
  - **'Reverse-functional'** – frustrating *offender's* purpose eg *disrupting criminal plans*
  - **'Reverse-causal'** – the causes the intervention aims to remove, weaken, divert (removing motivation, opportunity)
  - **Mechanistic** – how the intervention is supposed to work
  - **Technical/structural** realisation of intervention *principles* through a practical *method*
  - **Constructional/instructional** – how to manufacture, implement, install method
  - **Delivery** – targeting of interventions (eg *'primary, secondary, tertiary prevention'*)
  - **Mobilisation** – how to get people to implement the intervention – eg publicity
- Which discourses are suitable for CPTED?
  - at which stage of the iterative design process – from **requirements capture** to **concept design** (to **lab trial** to **field trial)** to **roll-out**?
  - For developing **standards and guidelines**?

Discourses: Caused agents

- Parallel discourses for offenders, preventers, promoters (users):
  - Perception, emotion, motivation are **caused**
  - Simultaneously, we are rational-ish. goal-oriented, **causing** – **instrum**

- Links to
  - Wortley's 2-stage **precipitation &** **opportunity** model
  - **risk/effort/reward + provocation** in 25 techniques of SCP
  - Wikström's **agency** model
  - Ekblom **Rich Offender** idea

Discourses: describing environment

Properties

– Space

– Movement

– Manipulation/force

– Shelter/refuge

– Perception/ prospect

– Understandability/ information

– Motivation/ emotion

– Ownership, competition, conflict

• Each has physical, psychological and social dimensions

All these can be influenced by good or bad design

Structural Features

– Nodes

– Paths

– Barriers /screens

– Enclosures/ containers

– Furniture

– Signage

Content

– People (bodies)

– Furniture

– Mobiles (cars etc)

Expanding the detail of properties, and of features & content that confer them

Sight

– Light

– Discrimination – camouflage etc

– Sightlines

» *features* affecting this property: **Dog-legs, Sight screens, Barriers, Recesses, Enclosures, Containers**

» *content* affecting this property: **Crowds, Parked cars**

Designable aspects of environment that help or hinder offenders/preventers

- **Structural Features**
  - Nodes
  - Paths
  - Barriers
  - Screens
  - Enclosures
  - Furniture
  - Signage

- **Movable content** eg
  - Vehicles
  - People's bodies
  - Containers

- **Properties**

  Physical, informational, psychological, social

  Described in **functional** terms relating to human purpose, and **causal** terms relating to human motivation
  - Space
  - Movement
  - Manipulation/force
  - Perception/prospect
  - Shelter/refuge
  - Understandability
  - Information
  - Motivation/emotion (ownership, territoriality)
  - Competition and conflict

Perception and Prospect – how do properties and features of environment influence **Vision for surveillance**?

| Sightlines | Who/ what can be seen from where |

Structural features affecting this property of environment:
- Bends, screens, barriers, recesses, enclosures

Content affecting this property:
- Human/vehicular presence, plants, containers

| Light | Intensity, colour, contrast, direction/glare, fluctuation etc |

Structural features affecting this property of environment:
- Barriers, surfaces - reflectivity

Content affecting this property:
- Vehicle lights, trees/shrubs, containers

| Background | Discriminability – camouflage etc |

Structural features affecting this property of environment:
- Surfaces - pattern

Content affecting this property:
- Vehicle lights, plants, containers, litter

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Surveillance –
here's one I prepared earlier

- An **activity** or purposeful **task** for which someone or some institution, acting in a **crime preventer role**, has taken responsibility

- **Surveillability** is an instrumental **property** of the **environment** conferred by **features** eg sightlines and lighting, that facilitate surveillance

- Surveillance may be undertaken in support of **Territoriality** and may exploit advantages of **Defensible Space** (prospect)

Surveillance

- Surveillance is a set of tasks/ part of role of being a **crime preventer**

- Surveillance is done by different crime preventer **roles**:

    - **Guardians** of Targets

    - **Managers** of Places

    - **Handlers** of (potential) Offenders

- Key distinction between

    - **Active** surveillance

    - **Passive** surveillance

    - **Potential** surveillance

Surveillance

- **Active – purposively collecting & interpreting information about crimes, crime situations and/or offenders**

  - to initiate and guide a **response** (of whatever kind)

  - to potential, ongoing or past criminal **event/s**

  - with the goals of **preventing/reducing criminal events, criminal harm and/or bringing offenders to justice**, whether or not surveiller's own interests are involved (eg in protecting their own car)

  - with or without **technological aids**

  - in a **formal or informal** role of crime preventer

  - played by **people** and/or **intelligent systems**

Surveillance

- **Passive – potential of people to become active surveillers through**

  – their **presence** or other access to information

  – their **perceptual/ judgmental capacity** (acuity, knowledge, skills, aids)

  – their **motivation**

  – the properties and features of **environment** they and offender are in

- **Potential surveillance - potential of environment, by virtue of its properties and features**

  – to **facilitate active surveillance** (eg sightlines for someone who is already looking out for criminal behaviour)

  – and/or to **convert passive to active** (to help catch the attention of people who might then become active, and help them respond – eg a terrorism poster)

Defensible Space

- An instrumental **property** of the **environment**

- Conferred by **features** eg barriers and markers, plus the property of surveillability

- Linked to **capacity of people** to defend it through human resources (eg numbers, assertiveness, knowledge of how to challenge and respond) and technical resources eg alarms

- **Defending** the space is an **activity** closely linked to **Territoriality**

Target hardening

- A preventive **activity** whose purpose is to give material or informational **targets of crime** the **property** of **resistance to physical attack** in the service of some offender's attempt to **misappropriate** (steal), **mistreat** (damage), **mishandle** (counterfeit, smuggle), **misuse** (as tool or weapon) or **misbehave** with (in antisocial behaviour)

- Note that hardening the **target** is often confused with hardening the **target enclosure** such as a building or compound which offenders wish to enter – this last is achieved eg by creating, strengthening or heightening barriers

- Hardened **enclosures** may contribute to **Defensible Space**

- **Target hardening** of built environment against mistreatment, misuse or misbehaviour may aid (or spoil) **Image and Maintenance**

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Hard or soft target?

Access control

- An **activity** intended to
  - Discriminate between individuals seeking to enter the interior **space** of an **enclosure** (in terms of who, when, what carrying/wearing and how they are behaving)
  - To prevent their committing crime by their presence (eg minors in a bar), or their actions once within the enclosure
- May be motivated and facilitated through **Territoriality** acting on owners/managers and visitors
- May be facilitated by **Defensible Space**

Activity support

- A **property** of the **environment** which variously
  - **Alerts, informs, motivates, empowers and directs** people to enter it and remain there
  - Where they act as **users** playing legitimate roles/undertaking legitimate activities, and thus as potential **crime preventers**
  - And/or which channels them away from **conflict** over space, noise, incompatible behaviour etc
- As preventers, legitimate users may simply
  - **Occupy space** that would otherwise have been taken by (potential) offenders
  - Their mere **presence** may **deter and discourage** offending
  - Or they may undertake **surveillance** and then appropriate preventive responses inc **informal social control**
- **Territoriality** may empower owners/managers to *influence* activity support, & visitors to *accept* influence

Image & Maintenance

- **Image** is an **individually/collectively** held **perception** with **emotional** content, of some complexity;
- It relates variously to
  - **Crime risk**
  - Wider **community safety/quality of life**
  - **Reputation** of residents/users etc
  - Influencing people's **decisions and actions** (eg to visit, work, live there)
- **Image and maintenance** together may influence **objective crime risk** by **prompting, provoking or permitting** offending through broken windows-type processes

Image & Maintenance

- **Maintenance** is **activity** (or the **state** of an **environment** reflecting that activity or its absence), which influences **image**

  – Both in terms of the litter, graffiti etc which may be present

  – And by the perception of the very fact that someone is/is not doing the maintenance

- Maintenance relates to **Territoriality** in terms of

  – Individuals, families or institutions being motivated and permitted to take responsibility for undertaking maintenance of a given **space**

  – and **defensibility** and **access control** to enable them to do the maintenance without interference, or risk of it being messed up

Territoriality

- Territoriality is both a **value** in itself (an Englishman's home is his castle) and an **instrumental means** to crime prevention ends

- As used in CPTED practice and literature, it is unclear whether it is a **human attribute**, or a socially-ascribed and physical **property** of **space**

- Best to consider it as both, subsumed under an **ecological** framework which includes human **agents** in relation to their **environment**

Territoriality – human side (1)

- A complex **propensity** of perceptual, emotional and motivational tendencies, goals and resources leading to responses of acquisition, preferential enjoyment, ownership, management, control and defence of a tract of space

- These processes may operate individually or collectively at group, community, institutional or national level

- Territoriality is a common human propensity but may be **realised** and **communicated** differently by different individuals and/or (sub)cultures

Territoriality – human side (2)

- Territory is held **relative to other possible owners**, so
  - There have to be relations of either **acceptance/legitimacy or conflict** between private parties, or with the involvement of the community and/or state
  - and **cultural understandings** of concepts of ownership, norms (and laws) of legitimate acquisition, use, defence etc
- Territoriality in particular requires people's **roles** to be understood
- **Sharing** of territory will pose particular issues

Territoriality – spatial side

- Has to be **extended** in space and **durable** over some time period (brief or lasting)
- May extend into virtual or cyber space
- Will normally have properties relating to **utility to users**
  - Either for **itself** (a private garden to enjoy)
  - Or as an **enclosure** to secure their person and belongings
- Has to have the **properties** of **identifiability** (whose is it?) and **demarkability** (where is it/what are its boundaries?)
- May also have properties of **access control** and **wider defensibility**, both of which may be facilitated by **surveillability** and **hardening of enclosure**
- Will have an **image** to the owner and/or to other parties
- Will usually require **maintenance**, which influences image
- All these properties may be influenced for good or for bad by
  - The **design** of the environment on micro to macro **scales**
  - In interaction with the **social context**

Next steps in the upgrade of CPTED

- So far I have been trying to clarify the individual concepts within CPTED

- It may be possible to make the whole schema consistent and reduce overlap by rearranging and disentangling the key concepts of CPTED

- But will need to ensure backward compatibility with existing knowledge and experience of practitioners

The Dark Side of the Environment

- We're familiar with 'Fortress society' and area stigma   but there's more:
  – Ironically, drug dealers and criminals use CPTED principles to create "offensible" space for own criminal activities
  – Territoriality used by gangs
  – Access control – exclusion

  – Professional defensible space

- **How to design against these?**

The social and cultural dimension – a challenge

- How can sociological and cultural discourses, concepts and theories critique the CPTED approach and my new take on it, in ways that are
  - Constructive
  - Rigorous
  - Theoretically interesting
  - Practically helpful?
- Do we stick with the existing 6 core concepts or are they up for re-formation?
- Do we start from basic, physical, psychological and social concepts and mechanisms and work up, or start with sociology/anthropology and work down?

TO BE CONTINUED…follow developments and contact us at

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www.designagainstcrime.com/web/crimeframeworks

Extras

Meeting the specification – Ideas for the CPTED upgrade

Social Dimension of CPTED

- **Social aspects should be well-articulated and clear, eg:**

  - **Social cohesion / social capital** – capacity of community to act together to solve problems like crime, on basis of trust, familiarity, shared norms

  - **Immediate motivation for crime**, including conflict, need for young people to have facilities

- *Once clarified how these and other factors relate to environmental causes of crime, **design the environment to support them***

Scale of CPTED

60

Scope of CPTED - Intervening upstream, downstream?

Planning

Design

Management & maintenance

Strategic imbalance

Police and

Management & Maintenance

Criminal Justice

Planning

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
Strategic balance – Put in most effort upstream – but leave human & physical flexibility downstream

Management & Maintenance

Planning

Design

When is design not design?
1. The technofix

- Shallow, single, exposed line of defence
- Bolt on, drop off

When is design not design? 2. Heavy engineering

- Does the basic job well enough, but…
  - Clunky, not user-friendly
 - Ugly, maybe fear-inspiring

Design – product or process?

Importance of process knowledge – throwing away the cookbook

- Adaptability, subtlety, tradeoffs – customising the response to context – creating and configuring plausible proposals for new circumstances

- Handling uncertainty and lack of complete knowledge of what works

- Anticipating & allowing for change

- Needs practitioners more like expert consultants than technicians - Diane Zahm calls it 'Moral improvisation'

THE SOUTH AFRICAN
Ostrich Cookbook

Pauline Henderson and Danelle Coulson

Strengthening the foundations for know-how

- Professionalisation? Eg through Conceptual frameworks
  - Expanding the **Crime Triangle – Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity**
  - Using **offender 'Scripts' – 'Seek, See, Take, Escape, Sell'** to capture the **dynamics** of crime
  - Developing main concepts e.g. **surveillance**
- Careful - expertise is needed, but not as a barrier – *professional defensible space*
- Importance of **co-design** with the **users** of buildings, streets, malls

# Framework for Thinking about Causes and Interventions

This?

…or this?

remote causes of crime or disorder event

Offender presence in situation

Target person or property

Anticipation of risk, effort and reward

Target enclosure

Resources for crime

Wider environment

Readiness to offend (motives/ emotion)

Absence of crime preventers

immediate precursors of crime or disorder event

Lack of skills to avoid crime

Crime promoters

Criminality (predisposition)

Crime or disorder event

SITUATION

OFFENDER

A map of diagnosis space: the **Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity**

Map of intervention space: crime prevention *principles* and the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity

Linking causes/risks of crime to design